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PROPERTY AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE II
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
In 1998 I published a short essay entitled Property and the Right
to Exclude.' It appeared in an issue of the Nebraska Law Review hon-
oring Lawrence Berger, a long-time property professor at Nebraska.
The essay has been rather widely cited, but I have my doubts as to
whether it has been widely read. A review of citations in Westlaw
suggests that the essay is commonly identified as arguing that the
right to exclude is the "sine qua non" of property, a statement that
appears in the opening paragraph.2 The typical citing author takes
this to mean that the essay argues the right to exclude is the only
relevant attribute of property, or that the right to exclude is the social
goal to which the institution of property is dedicated-two proposi-
tions disavowed in the essay. The author then uses this caricatured
view of the exclusion thesis as a foil against which to develop his or
her more nuanced or ethically satisfying view of property.
I stand by most of what I said in the Nebraska essay, including the
statement in the opening paragraph. Sine qua non is a Latin legal
term meaning "without which it could not be." In other words, with-
out the right to exclude, there can be no property. None of the at-
tacks on the right to exclude using the Nebraska essay as a foil has
convinced me that this is wrong. Does the right to exclude capture
every relevant attribute of the institution of property? No, but I did
not argue that. I said only that it was a foundational attribute of
property. Is the right to exclude the end or the ultimate value to
which the institution of property aspires, a vision caricatured in one
article as a society of hermits?3 Obviously not. Giving individuals
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. A condensed version of this
Article was presented at the 2013 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at William
and Mary Law School. I thank the Conference organizers for the honor of naming me the
Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize recipient for 2013, and the panelists and conference
attendees for their many insightful responses and comments.
1. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998)
[hereinafter Nebraska Essay].
2. Id. at 730.
3. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1841 (2006) (claiming "[t]he traditional account of the property right to
exclude emphasizes a solitary, isolated individual who excludes everyone from his land," and
labeling this "The Hermit's Right").
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the right to exclude others from particular resources is a way of orga-
nizing the management and control of resources in society. As such,
it is a means to promoting a variety of ends, including, I will argue,
a willingness to share resources. It also has a number of drawbacks,
which means there will inevitably be exceptions and qualifications
to the right to exclude. But I also said this explicitly in Nebraska essay.
The present Article revisits and expands upon the Nebraska essay.
I will begin by restating the argument of the Nebraska essay, which
I will call the exclusion thesis. After that, I will offer some clarifica-
tions, inspired by some of the critiques as well as my own reflections
in the time that has passed since the Nebraska essay was published.
Building on the clarified thesis, I will highlight some of the norma-
tive pros and cons of property that flow from the right to exclude. I
will then offer something new: an explanation for how the right to
exclude came to be the critical attribute differentiating property from
other social institutions. The explanation is grounded in the concept
of possession and the information cost advantages of using posses-
sion to differentiate between things that are mine and not mine as we
navigate through everyday life. Possession is based on a perception
of a capacity or intention to exclude others from a thing, and insofar
as the institution of property is built on or evolves from a foundation
of possession, I will argue that this accounts for why property always
entails a right to exclude. I will wrap up by offering a few observa-
tions about what has emerged as the dominant critique of the
exclusion thesis: that it promotes an excessively individualistic
conception of property and downplays the communitarian or social
obligation perspective on ownership.
I. THE EXCLUSION THESIS
The exclusion thesis, as set forth in the Nebraska essay, is analyt-
ical or interpretative. It is an attempt to advance our understanding
of what property means, by identifying a common thread among all
the interests we call property. Although the exclusion thesis has
normative implications, as I will discuss, it is not itself a normative
vision. Nor does it purport to exhaust the understanding of what is
entailed by the institution of property. The law of property, to state
the obvious, is quite complicated, and includes much besides the right
2
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to exclude others. What the exclusion thesis maintains is that if and
when we recognize something as property, we will invariably find the
right to exclude others.
Property, according to the exclusion thesis, is characterized by a
triadic relationship.4 The triad consists of an owner, a thing, and the
right of the owner to exclude others from the thing. Provided the
three elements are satisfied, the owner has property in the thing. If
any of the elements is missing, there is no property in the thing. The
Nebraska essay said that the right to exclude is a necessary and suf-
ficient condition of identifying something as property.' A more ac-
curate statement, although I think this was implicit in the essay, is
that all three elements of the triadic relationship are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient to make something property. But the
critical point is that the right to exclude others from the thing is
essential. Indeed, the scope of the owner's property rights is defined
by the extent of the owner's right to exclude. For example, if someone
has leased a car for a term of one year, and if being a leaseholder
gives one the right to exclude others from the thing that is leased,
then one has a property right in the car for one year.
The right to exclude is a right, not a duty; as such, the right to ex-
clude can be waived. When I wrote the Nebraska essay, I assumed
that the right to exclude entails the right to include, by simple op-
eration of waiving the exclusion right. I described exclusion as a
"gatekeeper" right,6 that is, the right to determine who can or can-
not enter or touch a particular thing. For this reason, I have been
surprised by articles that argue in favor of a "right to include" or
"right of entrance" and juxtapose this to the exclusion thesis.' Given
the nature of the right, the right to exclude and the right to include
are effectively the same thing. Admittedly, the only interest created
by a simple waiver of the right to exclude is a license, and as Dan
Kelly highlights, the law of property has given us a variety of more
permanent inclusionary devices, such as easements and leases, for
dividing up or sharing property.' I do not dispute this, but the point
4. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 2061, 2063 (2012)
[hereinafter Property Strategy].
5. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 740.
6. Id. at 740.
7. E.g., Eduardo M. Penalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005).
8. Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857 (2014).
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is not inconsistent with the exclusion thesis. To the extent the law
permits fragmentation of undivided property into lesser property
rights, each of the fragments entails a right to exclude.
Another important attribute commonly associated with property
is the right to use the thing. Undoubtedly a primary reason for creat-
ing and maintaining a system of property is to promote the effective
use of things. But the way we do this is by giving owners the right to
exclude others from the thing. In the Nebraska essay, I argued that
the right to exclude (and include) leads naturally to the right to use
a thing.' By giving the owner the right to determine who can enter
or touch a thing, we effectively give the owner the power to determine
the use of the thing. The right to exclude allows the owner to bar ac-
cess to those who would interfere with the owner's desired use, and
the right to include allows the owner to call on the services of various
agents and contractors who can assist in developing particular uses
of the thing.
James Penner has argued that the right to exclude is grounded in
our interest in the use of things.o If by this he means that the exclu-
sion right will only attach to things that have some use value, in the
sense that they are scarce relative to demand for them, this is surely
correct. The "things" to which the exclusion right attaches must be
resources that have value, meaning they have potential use. This
was mentioned in passing in the Nebraska essay," and I have made
it more explicit in subsequent writing.1 2 The "things" to which prop-
erty attaches are scarce resources that humans find valuable, and
they are valuable because they are things people want. Property does
not attach to things that are so plenteous they are not scarce, or to
things that no one wants.
If we go further, however, and maintain that the right to use is
the defining feature of property, as opposed to the right to exclude,
then I think the argument breaks down. For one thing, those who
argue for the primacy of the right to use, like Eric Claeys, stipulate
that this is a right of exclusive use.13 But how do we get to exclusive
9. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 741.
10. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997).
11. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 733.
12. Property Strategy, supra note 4, at 2063-64.
13. E.g., Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as
the Law of Things, 125 HARv. L. REV. F. 133, 143 (2012); Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is
Property a Thing or aBundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 633-34 (2009).
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use, without a right to exclude? At the very least, those who would
make a right to use an essential condition of property must also add
the right to exclude. For another, not everything we call property en-
tails a right to use. Pharmaceutical companies can obtain patents to
new drugs, and can thereby block others from making the drug, but
may have no right to use these patents without FDA approval. The
Penn Central Company had air rights above the Penn Central ter-
minal, and could exclude others from entering this airspace, but it
had no right to use this space because of a preservation order. 14 If
the government bars the owners of a wetland from draining or fill-
ing the land, the owner still has the right to exclude others from the
wetland, but the government edict may mean that there is little or
nothing in the way of effective use to which the land may be put. In
each of these cases-the drug patent, the air rights, the wetland-
the owner still has the right to exclude others, even if the owner has
no right to use the resource. Significantly, however, we still speak
of the owner as having property in the resource.
Still other important attributes of property involve the right to
transfer, whether by gift, sale, or inheritance. Here too we can say
that the right to transfer is a primary reason for establishing a sys-
tem of property. Some property, money being the clearest case, has
little or no value other than serving as a medium of exchange. But
again, the right to exclude is the means by which we make possible
the transfer of rights in things. We need to know which objects are
mine and which are yours before any transfer of rights to things can
take place. This division of the world is accomplished by giving each
of us rights to exclude others with respect to particular things. With-
out property, that is, without the right to exclude, there can be no gift-
giving, no contractual exchange, or no inheritance.
As in the case of the right to use, we can see how the right to ex-
clude easily morphs into a right to transfer. 1 Perhaps the place to
start is with abandonment of property. This can be regarded as a gen-
eralized waiver of any right to exclude, typically signaled by relin-
quishing possession of the object. By waiving all rights to exclude, the
owner signals that the object has been returned to the common pool,
and is open for claiming by others. In effect, the object has been trans-
ferred from A to an unknown future B, that is, the person who takes
14. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 742-44.
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up possession and now exercises the right to exclude. It is but a small
step from abandonment to gifts, which combine a relinquishing of any
right to exclude by the owner with an intention to designate a spe-
cific other as the new owner of the thing. A gift is typically signaled
by a transfer of possession from the giver to the recipient. It differs
from abandonment only in that we have a transfer of the object from
A to a known B. Once we recognize transfer by gift, it is yet another
small step to bargained-for exchange, for example by barter. Obvi-
ously, at some point the law kicks in, dictating various formalities that
must be observed to make an enforceable contract for the exchange
of rights or a valid will that provides for a transfer of property on
death. Nevertheless, the right to exclude is the major step that gets
us started down this path.
As in the case of the right to use, one can also have property
without having the right to transfer. The classic usufruct, which Bob
Ellickson has described as the earliest form of property in land, 16
gave the holder the right to exclude others while the land was in ac-
tive use. Nevertheless, the right was neither alienable nor inherit-
able. In the modern world, we also find instances where property is
declared inalienable for policy reasons, such as the ban on transfer
of eagle feathers, made to discourage the killing of eagles for com-
mercial gain." After the ban, we continue to regard eagle feathers
as being owned objects, because the owner has the right to exclude
others, even though the right to transfer has been taken away.
What then is the relationship between the right of persons to ex-
clude others from particular things and the other attributes com-
monly associated with property, such as the right to use and the right
to transfer? The right to exclude is a necessary condition, and to-
gether with the other legs of the triadic stool, the presence of a par-
ticular person and a particular thing of value, is jointly sufficient to
establish something as property. The right to use is obviously very
important and is nearly always associated with property, but it is
not a necessary condition. It is possible to have property without
having the right to use. The same holds for the right to transfer. The
right to transfer increases the value of property tremendously and
is nearly always associated with property, but again it is not a
16. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1364-68 (1993).
17. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
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necessary condition. It is possible to have property without having
the right to transfer.
The Nebraska essay argued that the primacy of the right to exclude
finds empirical support because it is a characteristic of virtually every-
thing that is commonly regarded as property." This includes not just
tangible property like land and chattels, but also intangible rights
like future interests, security interests, and stocks and bonds. In each
case, the holder of the intangible right can exclude others from inter-
fering with the right, for example by preventing others from interfer-
ing with a future interest once the condition is satisfied that allows
it to become possessory. The interests we call intellectual property,
including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, are also
characterized by the right to exclude others from certain types of
production, copying, or use of demarcated intellectual goods." The
fact that the exclusion thesis correctly identifies as property such a
broad array of interests commonly regarded as property is a strong
point in its favor.
The exclusion thesis does not maintain that everything of value
is property. Rights of bodily integrity and personal autonomy are,
like property, good against the world, but such rights do not pertain
to any particular thing separate and apart from the person. Contrac-
tual obligations that bind only the parties fall outside the thesis, since
they do not create rights against the world. The same can be said of
statutory entitlement programs that create a government obligation
to make payments to designated beneficiaries. These confer no right
to exclude others, at least not in the ordinary meaning of the term.
The fact that the Supreme Court has characterized some government
entitlements as "property" for procedural due process purposes re-
veals that there are some uses of the term property in law that de-
viate from the exclusion thesis.20 I regard these decisions as being
driven by an instrumental desire to strengthen the procedural rights
of entitlement holders, with the concept of property being stretched
beyond its ordinary meaning to achieve this goal. My claim is that
virtually everything commonly regarded as property is characterized
18. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 747-52.
19. In the case of trade secrets, this consists of a Holifeldian power to prevent others from
disclosing the secret.
20. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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by the right to exclude, not that the Supreme Court has correctly used
the concept of property in all its decisions.
II. CLARIFICATIONS AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Let me turn now to some clarifications of the exclusion thesis,
and, building on the clarifications, offer an outline of the normative
implications, pro and con, of giving individuals the right to exclude
others from things.
One important clarification about the exclusion thesis is that ex-
clusion is not absolute. This was made explicit in the concluding sec-
tion of the Nebraska essay.2 1 The common law recognized exceptions
to the right to exclude, such as the defense of necessity to an action
for trespass, and the public privilege to use navigable waters that
overflow private land. The immunity of landowners for committing
low-level nuisances ("live and let live") also necessarily qualifies the
exclusion rights of other owners. The modern regulatory state im-
poses many more restrictions, such as anti-discrimination laws.
If the right to exclude is a necessary condition of property, as the
exclusion thesis maintains, how can there be exceptions to the right
to exclude? These propositions can be reconciled once we recognize
that the right to exclude is a residual right. Property entails having
a general right to exclude after certain exceptions grounded in com-
mon law and statutes have been subtracted. There must be enough
residual exclusion to be able to say that the owner exercises signifi-
cant discretion about who can come and go and who can touch or use
the thing. But as long as we leave enough residual discretion in the
owner, we still regard the owner as having property. For example,
public utility companies may be highly constrained in terms of who
they must serve and at what prices. Yet they typically retain enough
discretionary authority over the selection, maintenance, and opera-
tion of their equipment and transmission lines that we readily iden-
tify these things as their property. Similarly, landlords in New York
City may be highly constrained in terms of what they can charge in
rent and when they may terminate a tenancy. Nevertheless, they
retain enough control over the selection of new tenants, determining
21. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 753.
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how to maintain the property, and establishing rules for the use of
the rental property, that we regard them as owners.
At some point, if the discretion of a person relative to a resource
becomes too constrained, we stop referring to the interest of the per-
son as property. Consider a security guard at a factory or an atten-
dant in a parking garage. Each of these persons has some authority
to exclude others from the things in question. Yet whatever author-
ity they have is very tightly circumscribed. The security guard, for
example, is authorized only to exclude trespassers from the factory.
He has no authority to determine what the factory will produce, when
it will be engaged in production, who shall be included as an employee
or supplier to implement these decisions, when it will be sold or leased,
and so forth. The parking garage attendant is authorized to deter per-
sons from stealing or vandalizing autos. But he has no authority to
sell a car, sit in it on his lunch break, or to let anyone but the owner
take the car for a joyride. We could say these persons are simply
agents or bailees of owners and, in so doing sidestep any issue about
ownership. But even aside from the law of agency, these sorts of
"excluders" do not have enough discretionary authority over how they
exercise the right to exclude to qualify as persons who exercise a re-
sidual right to exclude, that is, to qualify as owners.
Because the exclusion thesis is analytical or interpretative, it is
not a normative argument about the ends of property. In other words,
the thesis is not a claim that we have property because it is desirable
to exclude others from things. As my frequent co-author Henry Smith
has emphasized, the right to exclude is a means toward various ends,
not an end in and of itself.2 2 There are numerous points that bear on
a normative assessment of the institution of property, both good and
bad. I believe that the exclusion feature is responsible for many if not
most of these features. Thus, it is important to understand the ex-
clusion thesis before rendering judgment about the normative end
or ends of property as an institution.
In clarifying the role of the exclusion thesis in rendering norma-
tive judgments about property, it is helpful to consider further why the
right to exclude leads to various attributes of property that are nor-
matively relevant. Simplifying somewhat, the right to exclude confers
22. Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Means and Ends in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009).
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two general powers on owners. First, it gives them managerial author-
ity over the thing. It does this for the reasons previously noted with
respect to the right to use things. If someone has the right to exclude
(and include), they have the ability to control who enters or touches
the thing. And by controlling who enters or touches the thing, this
person, whom we call the owner, secures managerial control over the
thing. Larissa Katz has captured this understanding in arguing that
property entails the power to determine "the agenda" of the thing.2 3
Jeremy Waldron has said something similar. As he puts it, an owner
of property is someone who has the final decision "how the object
shall be used and by whom."2 4 What neither has noted is that this
agenda-setting or use-determining power derives from a more funda-
mental attribute, the right to exclude.
Second, the right to exclude gives owners accessionary rights with
respect to the thing. In other words, the owner automatically captures
changes in the value of the thing over time, including the fruits im-
mediately produced by the thing. Thus, the owner of land captures
the value of crops that grow on the land, the owner of a share of stock
captures the dividends and any appreciation in the value of the stock
due to retained earnings, and the owner of a patent captures the
monopoly rents that can be generated through commercial develop-
ment of the patent. These accessionary rights are again a function
of the right to exclude. The owner of land can exercise the right to ex-
clude not only to plant and till but also to harvest the crop. The same
point can be made about other property rights. This feature of prop-
erty requires that we develop understandings about what objects are
sufficiently prominently connected with the thing to constitute a
derivative or accessionary right to the original thing.25 For the most
part these understandings operate intuitively and without contro-
versy, such as the understanding that the tomato that sprouts on a
plant in a garden belongs to the owner of the garden. These under-
standings have been supplemented by a variety of legal doctrines,
such as the understanding that baby animals belong to the owner of
the mother (the doctrine of increase) and minerals under the ground
belong to the surface owner (the ad coelum rule).
23. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L. J. 275, 278
(2008).
24. Jeremy Waldron, What Is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 327 (1985).
25. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2009).
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Both managerial control and accessionary rights, consistent with
the earlier clarification about the exclusion right, are residual. Thus,
the right to manage a thing will be subject to various regulatory con-
straints imposed by common law and positive regulation. Similarly,
accessionary rights to a thing are subject to various contractual obli-
gations and taxes imposed by the state. Accessionary rights are thus
also residual rights, roughly equivalent to what economists have
called residual claims.
Let me briefly list some of the normative arguments that have
been advanced for and against property as an institution.2 6 In vir-
tually every case, these arguments flow either from the exclusion
right or from one or both of its derivative implications, residual man-
agerial authority and residual accessionary rights. First, on the posi-
tive side:
* Giving owners residual managerial authority over things es-
tablishes a highly decentralized mode of resource manage-
ment. This draws on local knowledge, which permits a more
efficient use of resources than would likely prevail if more
centralized or bureaucratic modes of resource management
were utilized.
* Combining residual managerial authority and residual ac-
cessionary rights creates a powerful incentive for owners to
invest effort and ingenuity in the use of resources so as to
maximize their value. Property, as the old saying goes, re-
wards labor by allowing the owner to reap what she has sown.
* Endowing owners with exclusionary rights over all things they
own allows owners easily to scale up and scale down their
business or residence, all the while maintaining the same
degree of control and accessionary rights over the combina-
tion of things they own.
* Establishing exclusionary rights to things eliminates the prob-
lems associated with open access resources like fisheries, such
as wasteful racing to grab resources, premature consumption
of resources, or inadequate restocking of resources.
* Creating exclusionary rights in things establishes the precon-
dition for engaging in exchanges of resources. Free exchange
26. The list is drawn from Property Strategy, supra note 4, at 2081-94, where the reader
will find appropriate citations.
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of resources allows those who value particular resources most
highly to end up with those resources, enhancing the general
welfare.
* Allowing individuals to exercise control over resources dif-
fuses power in society, thereby improving the prospects for
individual liberty, free expression of ideas, free association,
and democratic government.
* Permitting individuals to exercise exclusionary rights over
things facilitates the realization of personal goals and aspi-
rations, and hence promotes individual flourishing.
Let us now turn to the negative side of the ledger:
* Dividing up the world into separate units of discrete exclu-
sionary rights creates incentives to foist costs onto other units
of discrete exclusionary rights. Thus, although the exclusion
strategy solves some externalities-those associated with open
access regimes-it simultaneously creates the condition for
other externalities in the form of spillovers.
* Because of the exclusion feature, all property rights are
monopoly rights. When particular property rights have no
good substitutes, this allows owners to charge monopoly prices
for access to the resource they control, to the detriment of
consumers. 2 7
* Property rights are of little value unless interlaced with net-
works of roads, markets, recreational areas and other public
rights. Paradoxically, therefore, private exclusion rights are
dependent on public rights to realize their potential. Too much
exclusion, in the wrong places, can choke off the positive bene-
fits of property rights.
* Exclusion rights not only magnify incentives but also enhance
risks. Natural disasters, criminal predation, and illness pose
grave threats to those whose property is highly concentrated
in one form and place. Where insurance markets and social
safety nets are poorly developed, some form of communal shar-
ing may be necessary to reduce the risks of private ownership.
27. See Katarina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York
Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125 (2013) (recounting history of restrictions on the
number of taxi medallions in New York City and the monopoly rents this generates for
medallion owners).
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* Because of the accession feature, those who have property
tend to get more property, often without regard to their in-
genuity or effort. Insofar as the positive effects of exclusion
rights are dependent on a broad diffusion of property rights,
some form of redistribution may be necessary to counteract
the inherent tendency of property to beget more property.
Notice that one normative implication I have not listed is the pro-
motion of communitarian values: an impulse to share resources with
others, or a sense of obligation to others. This is a rather startling
omission, since the central critique of the exclusion thesis by those
who wish to promote more sharing, obligation to others, or commu-
nity values is that the exclusion feature works against these ends.
I have my doubts about this claim, but the issue is sufficiently im-
portant that I will defer it to Part IV of the Article.
Putting aside communitarian values, the current normative de-
bate over property largely turns on whether one is more impressed
with the list of benefits or the list of costs. Those who are more im-
pressed with the benefits would like to see exceptions to the right to
exclude held in check, in order to preserve the benefits of a robust
system of private property. The pro-property faction, if that is the
right term, would dial up the degree of exclusion associated with own-
ership in different contexts, in order to secure more of the benefits
of exclusion rights. Those who dwell on the costs would like to would
like to see more restrictions on the exclusion right, in order to ad-
vance competing social goals, such as environmental protection, re-
strictions on monopoly pricing, and a more egalitarian distribution
of wealth. They would dial down the level of exclusion, in order to
minimize the costs of property systems.
The exclusion thesis, as I see it, frames the debate but cannot re-
solve it. It all depends on what weight one attaches to the benefits
as opposed to the costs of private property. My own normative prefer-
ences fall on the side of strong property rights in most contexts. But
the normative case for this must be made independently of whether
the exclusion thesis is correct or not.
111. THE RELEVANCE OF POSSESSION
The Nebraska essay did not address the question of causation.
How did exclusion come to be the sine qua non of property, rather
2014] 13
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than something else, like the right to use or the promotion of human
flourishing or what have you? I will take a stab at answering that
question here. This is the short version: Exclusion lies at the root of
property because the institution of property is dependent on posses-
sion, and exclusion lies at the root of possession.
Possession plays a rather odd role in American property scholar-
ship. Every teacher of property law spends significant time dealing
with possession. The first possession cases, starring that perennial
favorite, Pierson v. Post,2 8 are invariably granted significant class
time. Adverse possession, whereby possession is transformed by the
passage of time into ownership, is routinely covered. Finders cases,
which confer special rights on possessors, are popular; bailments,
which entail a transfer of possession but not ownership, may also
make an appearance; and so forth. At some point there will almost
certainly be a reference to the old saw that possession is rather more
than nine points of the law.2 9
Yet, given all this attention to possession, there is surprisingly
little analysis of possession in the recent scholarly literature. Pos-
session is clearly different than property. Possession is often said to
be a fact; property is a legal right.3 0 This may be correct as a first ap-
proximation, but what is more telling, in terms of understanding the
nature of property systems, is respect for possession established by
others. Respect for possession of others is a social norm, or, as I will
argue momentarily, an ingrained human instinct shaped by social
norms. This phenomenon-respect for possession-is I believe the
foundation of the legal institution of property.
What does it mean to possess a thing? Everyone agrees possession
refers in some sense to control over a thing. There are longstanding
debates among civil law scholars about whether the required element
of control refers to actual control, an intention to control, or some of
both.31 It may be that actual control is necessary in order to establish
an initial claim of possession. In first possession cases, some courts
have held that even the clearest manifestation of an intention to
28. 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1805).
29. Corporation of Kingston-upon-Hull v. Horner (1774) (Mansfield, J.).
30. Indeed, this truism is repeated in the Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 732-33.
31. Yun-chien Chang, The Economy of Concept and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOlIICS
OF POSSESSION (Yun-Chien Chang ed.) (forthcoming 2014) (reviewing different positions among
civilians about actual controls versus intent to control).
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control will not suffice to establish possession, unless and until actual
control has been established. Once actual control has been established,
however, an intention to maintain control will often suffice, even if
there are lapses in actual control. In the famous case of Haslem v.
Lockwood,32 the plaintiff gathered droppings of manure on the road
into piles, left them for a day, and returned to find them gone; the
court held he had established possession because the gathering into
piles signaled an intention to control the manure. In the law of lar-
ceny, some courts have gone even further and have held that a clear
manifestation of an intention to deprive someone of control is enough
to establish criminal liability, even if the thief does no more than
touch the object.33
But let us put aside questions about the relative proportions of
actual control and intention to control in determining when someone
is in possession of a thing. What does control mean in this context?
It means, quite simply, that a person is in a position to exclude
others from a thing. Thus, in Eads v. Brazelton,34 the initial finder,
Brazelton, was deemed not to be in possession of a sunken vessel,
because he had not placed his salvage operation over the site in such
a way as to exclude Eads from gaining access to the wreck. When
speaking of an intention to maintain control, what we mean is that
the person has signaled an intention to exclude others from taking
the thing. In Haslem, putting the manure into piles signaled an in-
tention to exclude others from the manure, even if the plaintiff lost
the capacity to do so temporarily. Thus control of a thing, actual or
intended, means excluding others from the thing.3 5
What is missing from property scholarship is the recognition that
possession plays a ubiquitous role in everyday life. Ask yourself this:
How is it possible that people can navigate through everyday life
without getting into constant disputes over who has the right to
exploit different objects of value? The answer, I submit, is a near-
universal respect for possession established by others. We ascertain
whether something is possessed based on physical cues about the
32. 37 Conn. 500 (1871).
33. People v. Olivo, 420 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1981).
34. 22 Ark. 499, 79 Am. Dec. 88 (Ark. 1861).
35. See Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession,
86 VA. L. REV. 535, 547 (2000) (characterizing Holmes as understanding possession to entail
an intent to exclude others from interfering with one's own use of a thing).
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relationship between persons and tangible things. We process this
information instantaneously and unconsciously. When something is
perceived to be possessed, we steer clear of it, just as we expect others
to steer clear of things in our possession. The process works the same
in both intimate and anonymous social settings. Even thieves are
highly selective about which objects in possession of others they tar-
get for appropriation. In most of their interactions with others, even
thieves respect possession established by others.
Take a scene with which you are all no doubt highly familiar: an
airport passenger terminal. Dozens, sometimes hundreds or even
thousands, of people are walking, standing or sitting in the terminal.
Nearly all of them are pulling some suitcase on wheels or carrying
a backpack or some other kind of satchel. Why are these people not
engaged in a constant struggle to seize control of the choicest-looking
suitcases or satchels? Is it because they fear the police would arrest
them? Maybe, but outside the security gate, there may not be very
many police around. In a busy airport it would be fairly easy to snatch
a suitcase from a dozing passenger and disappear into the crowd. No
doubt this happens, but it seems to be a rare occurrence. And think
of the curious scene in the arrivals area, where elaborate conveyor
belts spew forth dozens of suitcases to waiting passengers, and many
more suitcases are often lined up on the side, awaiting the arrival of
some claimant on an earlier or later flight. Remarkably, individuals
arriving on flights carefully scrutinize each bag as it comes off the
conveyor, taking care to claim only their own, often marked by some
colored ribbon or tape, and not someone else's. Here it would seem to
be even easier to grab a choice-looking suitcase belonging to someone
else and jump in a cab before being detected. Again I assume this hap-
pens, but not very often-certainly not often enough to generate a
demand for systematic inspection of claim tickets by security guards.
Nor do I think we can ascribe the respect for suitcases of others to
a social norm, at least not the kind of norm developed through re-
peated interactions of persons living in close-knit communities. 36
When I pass through O'Hare Airport I rarely encounter another per-
son I know, even though I lived in Chicago for most of my adult life.
Nearly everyone is a stranger to everyone else, and yet the respect
for possession seems secure. More strikingly still, consider that the
36. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 177-78 (1991).
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scene I have described is virtually the same the world over. It is no
different in Richmond, Virginia, than it is in Moscow, or Taipei, or
Nairobi. How is it possible that expensive-looking suitcases belong-
ing to anonymous travelers remain undisturbed, for the most part,
in all the corners of the world?
The reason there is no free-for-all over suitcases in airports is that
people instinctively respect possession established by others. I say
instinctively advisedly. Respect for possession established by others
is likely something that is hardwired in human psychology. It is a
species of what Daniel Kahneman calls "thinking fast" or System 1
cognition.17 It occurs automatically and unconsciously, without any
effort at deliberate reasoning on our part. As Jim Krier has suggested,
the roots of this instinct may lie in our evolutionary past." Biologists
have identified an evolutionarily stable "bourgeois game," in which
animals aggressively defend their territory from attack but retreat
in the face of a defense of territory by another. The possession in-
stinct may derive from a similar innate proclivity. In other words it is
in our genes, having been selected out for its superior survival value
over the millennia. Be that as it may, a virtually automatic respect
for possession established by others appears to be the best explana-
tion for how human beings navigate, without confusion or turmoil,
through the everyday world filled with valuable objects.
Although the possession instinct appears to be universal through-
out human societies, the particular signs used to communicate an in-
tention to possess undoubtedly have a social element." Bob Ellickson's
well-known study of the different social norms for establishing posses-
sion among different whaling communities is an example.' Depending
on the species of whale pursued and its behavior, there were varia-
tions in what communicative acts were required to establish posses-
sion, for example in terms of whether a line must be maintained
between the harpoon and the whaling vessel. This was clearly part
37. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
38. James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 139 (2009).
39. On the communicative aspect of possession, see Carol M. Rose, Possession as the
Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78 (1985); Henry E. Smith, The Language of
Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
40. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989).
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of the cultural knowledge transmitted within each whaling commu-
nity. The more important point, for present purposes, is that all whal-
ing communities followed a rule of first possession in allocating rights
to particular whales among whaling vessels. The variations involved
the communicative acts that signaled possession, not the basic prin-
ciple of respect for possession established by others. With respect to
suitcases in airports, the use of luggage tags and colored ribbons to
identify suitcases possessed by others is undoubtedly learned behavior.
In this case, the learning appears to have spread rapidly throughout
the world and is so obvious it requires no explicit instruction. People
quickly pick it up observing what other people do. The rapid diffu-
sion of common signs is made possible, I would suggest, because the
instinct for respecting possession is universally shared.
Why does possession perform the task of differentiating among
objects in the everyday world rather than ownership? The reason,
I believe, is that ascertaining possession, in most situations, entails
very low information costs. Information about possession can be gath-
ered at a glance and processed by our brain automatically and instan-
taneously. Possession is based on physically observable facts about
the relationship between persons and tangible objects. Significantly,
possession applies only to tangible things like land and chattels. One
can possess land, cars, clothing, laptop computers, and suitcases; one
cannot possess an invisible right, such as a future interest, a secu-
rity interest or an intellectual property right. The evidence used to
establish possession consists of physical facts about the relationship
between natural persons and tangible objects. The relevant facts are
those that indicate that particular persons have established control
over particular objects and/or are signaling an intention to maintain
control over the object. Our brain uses this evidence, quickly and re-
flexively, to raise inferences about whether objects are possessed or
unclaimed. If possessed, we avoid interfering with the object. Others
do the same. The result is that airport terminals exhibit very little
discord in matching thousands of objects with thousands of persons,
many of whom come from foreign cultures and nearly all of who are
complete strangers to each other.
Establishing ownership, in contrast, entails much higher informa-
tion costs. Establishing ownership entails ruling out any superior
right in third parties, which means tracing the chain of title back in
18
PROPERTY AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE II
time. Thus, ownership is established primarily by documentary evi-
dence, such as bills of sale, deeds, certificates of title, and registries
of rights. It takes time and some sophistication to uncover and inter-
pret these documents. Ownership is often qualified by invisible rights,
such as security interests and future interests, which are even more
difficult to establish and interpret. And owners include not just nat-
ural persons, but also artificial entities like corporations that act
through natural persons, which raises potential questions of author-
ity and agency.4 1 It is conceivable that in some futuristic world per-
sons could navigate through valuable objects using the concept of
ownership. They could wear some new generation of Google glasses
that would scan small bar codes on objects that embody the relevant
documentary information about ownership, which information would
then be processed by a computer, which would then send a verbal mes-
sage to the person wearing the glasses about the ownership status
of each object encountered. But think back to the airport terminal.
The number of messages would be overwhelming, not to say irritating.
Far better to rely on the computer that has evolved in our brains,
which sends silent messages like "not yours," "not yours," "not yours,"
"yours!" -messages that allow us to navigate successfully through
the world of objects without thinking about it.
Even if possession is critical to everyday interactions among peo-
ple and their objects, and perceptions of possession entail some com-
bination of capacity to exclude and intention to exclude, why does it
follow that property should similarly be anchored in a right to ex-
clude? The answer has already been intimated. Because possession,
for information-cost reasons, is the concept that dominates world of
objects in everyday life, it is critical that property and possession
remain synchronized. If possession were grounded in one concept
(exclusion), and property in another (need, promotion of human flour-
ishing, whatever), there would be too much incompatibility for the
system to bear. This is because the system of property rights-a legal
institution-presents an enormous information-cost problem, given
the very large number of persons and objects covered by the system.
The only way to overcome this information-cost problem is to borrow
from the information-saving attributes of possession.
41. BENITO ARRUNADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE 76-85
(2012) (making the point that questions of agency authority in corporations parallel questions
of title in property transfers).
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Consider, as one striking example of the dependence of property
on possession, the use of possession as a proxy for ownership in vir-
tually all low-valued transfers of property rights. If you buy a bottle
of water from a street vendor, for example, you do not demand docu-
mentary evidence that the vendor has good title to the bottle of water
sitting in his cooler. The fact that the vendor is in possession of the
water bottle is taken as sufficient evidence of the vendor's capacity
to transfer title. We accept possession as evidence of title in these
circumstances for the obvious reason that the transaction costs of
doing a "title search" of the water bottle would be prohibitive, relative
to the value of the object being exchanged. As objects become more
valuable and durable, the calculus changes. Thus, we do title searches
before transferring ownership of land or airplanes, and sophisti-
cated purchasers of artwork will demand evidence of the provenance
of the work before they buy. But for consumables like food and bever-
ages, articles of clothing, and most other forms of personal property,
possession functions as a stand-in for ownership. Notice that there
is no bright line separating this possession proxy from title-searching
as modes of establishing ownership. Purchasers of land nearly always
do a title search and inspect the property for evidence of undisclosed
possession. And the transfer of some expensive personal property,
like antique jewelry, may also entail an investigation of provenance.
Clearly, it would be awkward and confusing rigorously to separate
possession and title as modes of determining ownership. Far better
to synchronize the concept of ownership with possession, which
means in effect that ownership, like possession, must be grounded
in exclusion.
Further illustrations of dependence arise in resolving disputes be-
tween possessors and owners. Ownership trumps possession, but as
previously indicated the costs of establishing ownership are much
higher than the costs of ascertaining possession. Not surprisingly,
therefore, when disputes break out between possessors and would-
be owners, the first step in resolving the dispute is to enforce the right
of possession. When the police are called to mediate a fight between
a repo man and the owner of an auto, or to determine whether a land-
lord is entitled to evict a tenant, the police generally allow possession
to remain undisturbed pending a more formalized resolution of the
respective rights of the parties. Again, one can say that the concept
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of possession is being deployed as a surrogate for title, given that
the urgency of the situation does not permit any kind of investiga-
tion of the chain of the title before deciding who is entitled to the
thing in question.
The general point is this. Respect for possession established by
others is a universal attribute of human societies. Call it a social
norm or an instinct shaped by social norms or whatever you want.
Respect for possession operates through perceptions that individuals
have either established the capacity to exclude others from things
or have an intention to exclude others from things. Property is a legal
institution, one that exists only in societies that have some formalized
method of adjudicating rival claims to particular resources. Prop-
erty, as a legal institution, is dependent upon respect for possession,
and interacts with possession in many critical ways. There are prob-
ably multiple reasons for this, but a basic one is information costs:
information about possession is much cheaper and quicker to pro-
cess than is information about ownership. In order for this inter-
action to work, however, property-the legal institution-must mimic
or be synchronized with the basic features of possession. This means
the right to property must always include, as one critical element, the
right to exclude.
IV. SHARING PROPERTY
Let me close with some brief comments about the burgeoning lit-
erature that attacks the right to exclude on the ground that it deval-
ues the importance of community, social cooperation, and sharing
of resources. Preliminarily, I would distinguish two positions.
One, which is a variant on conventional egalitarianism, wants
more people to participate in the benefits of owning property. Those
who espouse this view look at the list of benefits of property set forth
in Part II, especially the benefits of prosperity, security, liberty and
the development of personhood, and say: If property does these good
things, then everyone should have some property! This was essentially
the argument of Charles Reich, in The New Property,42 who worried
about the proliferation of licenses, jobs, and benefits dependent on the
discretion of the state. He wanted to redefine these entitlements as
42. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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"property," in order to provide those whose livelihood was dependent
on them the benefits associated with property. Another prominent
voice sounding this theme is Hernando de Soto,4 3 who wants to trans-
form informal occupancy rights in developing countries into formal
property rights, in order to provide greater access to credit markets
by the poor.
I think Reich was in error in thinking that discretionary govern-
ment benefits can be reconceived as property. The entitlements he
considered are more like revocable licenses or contracts. Otherwise,
I have no particular quarrel with "more property" proposals. Indeed,
there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that wide-
spread distribution of conventional property maximizes both the eco-
nomic and the social and political advantages of a private property
system. There are of course serious questions about how to generate
or sustain a more egalitarian distribution of property. I regard expro-
priation as a bad idea, and pushing people to buy homes using sub-
prime loans is not much better. Making education widely available
and reducing the regulatory impediments to starting new business
ventures are better ideas. In any event, I see nothing in the "more
property" version of the argument for greater sharing incompatible
with the exclusion thesis. The disadvantaged and disfavored who
previously have had little or no property will want to be able to exer-
cise the exclusion right once they get their hands on some property,
in order to capitalize fully on the advantages of ownership.
A second variant on the need for more sharing is more problem-
atic. This is the idea that the government should enforce greater
sharing of existing property rights, by mandating access to valuable
resources, restricting changes in use, imposing rent controls, com-
pelling mediation before co-owners can seek partition, and the like.
I will call this the "forced sharing" argument.' Forced sharing differs
43. HERNANDO DE SoTo, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000).
44. I cannot provide a complete bibliography of works that espouse some variant on what
I have characterized as the "forced sharing" position. Prominent works that I have in mind
include Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011);
Eduardo M. Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 821 (2009); and JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000). Obviously, I cannot do justice
to the many subtleties in argument or variations in approach reflected in these and other
related works. What generally unites them in my mind is a critique of the exclusion thesis
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from the standard arguments for restricting exclusion rights in order
to limit externalities, control abuses of monopoly, or to provide public
goods like roads. These standard arguments are designed to restrict
the exercise of exclusion rights by some in order to enhance the value
of property rights more generally. Forced sharing also differs from
proposals for government insurance or social safety nets, in order to
reduce the risks of private ownership, or arguments for progressive
taxation, in order to mitigate the tendency of property systems to
produce increasing inequalities. These programs generally proceed
by taxing fungible income or wealth and do not necessarily entail
modifying the traditional prerogatives of ownership. Forced sharing,
in contrast, advocates tinkering with the mechanics of the institu-
tion of property itself, in order to open the gates to more widespread
participation in the use and enjoyment of discrete resources. The
battle stanchion of the forced sharing proponents is the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Shack,45 which suggested the
right to exclude is subject to override by courts based on an ex post
balancing of the interests of the owner and the parties seeking ac-
cess. The ultimate vision here is imposing some kind of "just cause"
limitation on the right to exclude, with courts or some other agency
of government passing judgment on whether owners have suffi-
ciently good reasons for managing their property the way they do.
One obvious concern is that too much dilution of the exclusion
right will sap the engine of property of much of its vitality. Forced
sharing would inevitably result in more complicated management
problems, with more people demanding access to resources and
more conflicts among competing claimants to sort out. Owners
would worry about what the "Sharing Commission" will say about
their resolution of these conflicts and consequently would have less
time and energy to devote to managing the resources themselves.
Larger owners would hire "sharing compliance officers," giving cor-
porations a comparative advantage relative to small proprietors. In
order to avoid litigation, owners would tend to steer clear of deci-
sions that might be questioned as violating the sharing principle.
coupled with an endorsement of significant governmental restrictions on the prerogatives of
ownership in order to promote distributive justice goals.
45. 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
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Overall, greater timidity would creep into the management of prop-
erty. Innovation and experimentation would decline. Idiosyncratic
uses of property, including perhaps uses by dissenting religious sects
or political groups, would be discouraged.
Less obviously, it is not clear to me that forced sharing would lead
to more sharing. It all depends on whether people are more likely to
share resources voluntarily or if sharing will be better promoted by
government compulsion. It is plausible, to me at least, that people
have a natural impulse toward communal engagement and that there
is an "altruism instinct" to go along with the possession instinct.4 6
Secure and relatively unqualified property rights may increase the
willingness of owners to share with neighbors and friends, if only
because they are confident that if the sharing does not work out,
they can terminate the sharing by reasserting their right to exclude.
If forced to share, the natural impulse toward sociability and altru-
istic sharing may be extinguished. Owners may do as little as possible
to comply with regulatory mandates, or may exchange their property
for other resources that are easier to conceal or that can be moved
to jurisdictions where sharing is not compelled.
There are unquestionably counterarguments. Regulatory mandates
can change preferences. Seat belt laws have changed people's atti-
tudes about using seat belts; laws against smoking inside public
buildings have presumably discouraged some people from smoking.
Perhaps forced sharing of property would eventually shape prefer-
ences by developing a taste for sharing. I have my doubts. It would be
hard to argue that there is more sharing between landlords and ten-
ants in jurisdictions like Berkeley and New York that have rent and
eviction controls than there is in jurisdictions without such controls.
And I am skeptical that colleges in New Jersey are more hospitable to
outsiders demonstrating on campus, where such access is mandated,4 7
than are schools in other states where access is left to the discretion
of the college. But it is ultimately an empirical question.
What can hardly be doubted is that if there is no "altruism instinct,"
in other words, if people are entirely self-centered and selfish, then
forced sharing is unlikely to yield more sharing. Instead, questions
46. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Eaton et al., Is Altruism a Genetic Trait?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Sept. 30, 2010).
47. Princeton University v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
24
PROPERTY AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE II
about sharing of resources would be transferred from the realm of
individual discretion to the political realm. And if people are self-
centered and selfish, then the outcome in the political realm will be
a function of the relative power and capacity for political organiza-
tion of those who have resources as opposed to those who do not. Here
there can be little doubt that those who have, being a relatively
more concentrated interest, will as a general matter out-organize
and out-lobby the relatively unorganized set of persons who prefer
more sharing. Forced sharing, on these assumptions, would simply
sap the institution of property of much of its vitality with little gain,
other than an increase in the size and complexity of government.
CONCLUSION
The right to exclude, I continue to believe, is an essential condition
of identifying something as property. Exclusion is not the only impor-
tant attribute of property. The right to include, to use, and to transfer
are all obviously important, but they are dependent upon and derive
from the right to exclude, which is indispensable. Exclusion is not
a goal or valuable end of the institution of property. It is a critical
feature that produces a variety of ends, many good, some bad. The
normative evaluation of property as an institution depends on how
we weigh the goods versus the bads. I have argued here that the
right to exclude is an essential feature of property because exclusion
of others is an essential feature of possession, and property builds
on and relies continually on possession in many of its operations. As
for those who argue that the right to exclude should be compromised
in order to promote forced sharing of resources, I think the conse-
quences of moving too far in this direction would be undesirable, and
I am skeptical that in the final analysis forced sharing would increase
the total amount of sharing we witness.
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